5 Many Western scholars confuse authoritarianism with totalitarianism and define it as absence of democracy and meaningfully protected human rights. Anne-Marie Slaughter, in 'International Law in a World of Liberal States ' , 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) , 503, 514 and 509, argues that liberal States constitute 'a world of peace, democracy, and human rights ' and '[l] iberal international relations theory applies to all states. Totalitarian governments, authoritarian dictatorships, and theocracies can all be depicted as representatives of some subset of actors in domestic and transnational society, even if it is a very small or particularistic slice' (emphasis in original). As noted in Chapter 2, an authoritarian dictatorship is a misnomer. An authoritarian government relies on inculcation in its people of certain beliefs, norms and values in order to maintain and exercise control, and not on overt coercion as a dictatorship does. In addition, an authoritarian government may be a democratically elected one, as many Western governments evidence.
However, is authoritarianism5 perforce incompatible with human rights and democracy? Do Western conceptions of human rights and democracy constitute the only viable and proper interpretations to which there are no alternatives? What are Chinese conceptions of human rights and democracy, and how might these conceptions enhance or undermine the human rights project? With its increasingly adept socialisation with international organisations as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, how has China's approach to international human rights law evolved since its realisation of the roles it may play in shaping international law, how international human rights norms might already have contributed to human rights protection under China's Constitution and laws, and might China reconcile its governance with the rule of law? Are democratic practices entirely absent in China; if not, in what forms do they manifest? At a fundamental level, is it possible that China's experience may help augment our understanding and the development of international human rights law and democracy through a mixture of convergence and divergence? These questions raise interesting and important issues from scholarly, political and legal standpoints that this chapter examines.
This chapter first discusses China's conceptions of human rights and democracy, cognisance of which is essential not only to understanding the human rights situation in China but also to the legitimacy of international human rights law and the merits and flaws of liberal democracy. As noted in Chapters
